A Study to Determine Damage Assessment Methods or Models on Air Force Networks by Thiem, Lisa S.
Air Force Institute of Technology 
AFIT Scholar 
Theses and Dissertations Student Graduate Works 
3-2005 
A Study to Determine Damage Assessment Methods or Models 
on Air Force Networks 
Lisa S. Thiem 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd 
 Part of the Systems Engineering Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Thiem, Lisa S., "A Study to Determine Damage Assessment Methods or Models on Air Force Networks" 
(2005). Theses and Dissertations. 3826. 
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/3826 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more 
information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A STUDY TO DETERMINE DAMAGE 
ASSESSMENT METHODS OR MODELS ON  
AIR FORCE NETWORKS 
 
THESIS 
 
LISA S. THIEM, Capt, USAF 
AFIT/GIR/ENV/05M-18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 
AIR UNIVERSITY 
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 
 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or 
position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the United States 
Government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AFIT/GIR/ENV/05M-18 
 
 
A STUDY TO DETERMINE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT METHODS OR MODELS 
 ON AIR FORCE NETWORKS 
 
 
THESIS 
 
 
 
Presented to the Faculty 
 
Department of Systems and Engineering Management 
 
Graduate School of Engineering and Management 
 
Air Force Institute of Technology 
 
Air University 
 
Air Education and Training Command 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
 
Degree of Master of Science in Information Resource Management 
 
 
 
 
Lisa S. Thiem, BS 
 
Captain, USAF 
 
 
March 2005 
 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AFIT/GIR/ENV/05M-18 
 
 
 
 
 
A STUDY TO DETERMINE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT METHODS OR MODELS 
 ON AIR FORCE NETWORKS 
 
Lisa S. Thiem 
Captain, USAF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved: 
 
 
          /signed/         16 Mar 05 
_______________________                              _________ 
Dennis Strouble, PhD (Chairman)             date 
 
 
 /signed/         16 Mar 05 
______________________________      _________ 
Summer Bartczak, Lt Col, USAF, PhD (Member)          date 
 
 
 /signed/         16 Mar 05 
______________________________      _________ 
David Van Veldhuizen, Major, USAF (Member)          date 
 
 
 
 
 
AFIT/GIR/ENV/05M-18 
 
Abstract 
 
 Damage assessment for computer networks is a new area of interest for the Air Force.  
Previously, there has not been a concerted effort to standardize methods used for damage 
assessment or develop a model that can be applied in assessing network damage.  This research 
attempts to identify if the Air Force MAJCOM Network Operations Support Centers (NOSC) or 
the Air Force Computer Emergency Response Team (AFCERT) use damage assessment models 
or methods.  If they do use a model or method, an additional question of how the model was 
attained, decided upon, and trained for is asked.  Additionally a question is asked to ascertain at 
what level network damage assessment should be performed.  All information comes from 
interviews, via e-mail or telephone, of managers in charge of computer security incidents at the 
MAJCOM NOSC or AFCERT.  Currently, there is some evidence to show that several 
organizations are using some form of network damage assessment; however, each organization 
has highly individualized damage assessment methods that have been developed internally.  This 
uniqueness does not allow for the method or model used at one location to be used at another 
location without modifications.  Also, since the method or model is unique to each organization, 
the results achieved by the method or model cannot be generalized and reproduced across the Air 
Force. 
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A STUDY TO DETERMINE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT METHODS OR MODELS 
ON AIR FORCE NETWORKS 
 
I.  Introduction 
Problem Statement  
 The purpose of this study is to determine if the Air Force is using a damage 
assessment process when dealing with security “incidents” occurring on its networks or 
computers.  This study attempts to determine what, if any, models or methods are 
currently used to accurately assess network damage that occurs when a network is hit by 
worms, viruses, hackers, malicious insiders, or other threats.  It also attempts to 
determine how the models or methods work and how they were determined to be useful 
in damage assessment. 
Definitions 
 The research being undertaken requires a common set of terms to be used by the 
reader to provide clarity and understanding.  The terms defined include:  damage 
assessment, information system, incident, and computer forensics. 
 For the purpose of this study an information system is defined as: 
The entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and components for the 
collection, processing, storage, transmission, display, dissemination, and 
disposition of information. 2) All the electronic and human components 
involved in the collection, processing, storage, transmission, display, 
dissemination, and disposition of information. An IS may be automated 
(e.g., a computerized information system) or manual (e.g., a library’s card 
catalog). 
(www.ciao.gov/ciao_document_library/glossary/I.htm: 2004). 
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 The damage assessment definition used by CISCO Systems, a leading provider of 
network products, is:  once an attack has been confirmed on a system or network, the 
initial portion of the remediation process will be damage assessment to determine the 
extent of damage the successful attacker caused on that system or network 
(http://business.cisco.com/glossary: 2005).  Initially, this definition was useful since it 
discusses the extent of damage caused by an attacker to a network.  However, this 
definition does not explain what form the damage assessment takes, whether it is a 
method or model that can be used by other organizations, or if it produces the same 
results each time it is applied to the same problem.  For the purpose of this study, a 
modified definition of damage assessment is used.  In this study damage assessment is 
defined as a method or model that can provide accurate, re-producible information about 
the tangible and intangible effects of a network attack (virus, hacker, insider, natural 
disaster).   An incident is any adverse event whereby some aspect of computer security 
could be threatened: loss of data confidentiality, disruption of data or system integrity, or 
disruption or denial of availability"( http://www.dfn-
cert.de/eng/pre99papers/certterm.html: 2004).    The definition of an incident may vary 
for each organization depending on many factors. The following are categories of 
incidents and examples that are considered generally applicable by the German Computer 
Emergency Response Team (CERT) who developed a Glossary of Computer Security 
Incident Handling Terms and Abbreviations to use when discussing incidents  
(http://www.dfn-cert.de/eng/pre99papers/certterm.html: 2004).   The German CERT put 
together a glossary of common terms based on available documents from around the 
world, including Force Computer Emergency Response Team (AFCERT).  The following 
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are definitions of types of incidents the German CERT have found and examples they use 
for clarification of the meanings  
(http://www.dfn-cert.de/eng/pre99papers/certterm.html: 2004):  
* Compromise of integrity, such as when a virus infects a program or the 
discovery of a serious system vulnerability  
* Denial of service, such as when an attacker has disabled a system or a 
network worm has saturated network bandwidth  
* Misuse, such as when an intruder (or insider) makes unauthorized use of 
an account  
* Damage, such as when a virus destroys data  
*Intrusions, such as when an intruder penetrates system security 
(http://www.dfn-cert.de/eng/pre99papers/certterm.html: 2004). 
When an incident occurs and legal issues are raised in a court of law, forensics is 
the area concerned with developing evidence in criminal cases that can be used in a court.  
Not just any evidence, but evidence at the lowest, most rudimentary level of a criminal 
investigation.  Forensics is much broader, though, than a tool to catch criminals.  It is also 
used by organizations to find problems such as misuse of corporate property or time, 
misconduct, and attempted computer or network  incidents.  In 1991, the term “computer 
forensics” was coined by the International Association of Computer Specialists (IACIS) 
(NTI INC.: 2004).    Computer forensics is also called network forensics, forensic 
computer science, media analysis, and network analysis (Yasinac, 2003: 15).  For 
purposes of clarity, the definition used in this paper comes from a white paper put out by 
Technology Pathways.  It says that computer forensics is “computer science in support of 
the law” (Brown: 2002).  The nature of forensics is to develop information to be used in a 
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court of law.  Brown’s description appears to encompass all of the varied aspects of 
computer forensics and is still generic enough to allow for differences in types of 
incidents and methods of acquiring evidence.   Electronic evidence is also a new term that 
has been defined as: “any record, data, file, source code, program, computer 
manufacturer specifications, and other imprint on a computer storage device” 
(www.computer-forensics: 2002).  Electronic evidence is the output provided by a 
computer forensics investigation which can be used to convict a criminal or prove 
wrongdoing within an organization.  Much can be drawn from computer forensics 
practices and tools that can be utilized in damage assessment. 
Background    
 The Air Force defined information as a weapon/target in its publication Global 
Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force (Department of the Air Force, 
2003: 3).  By redefining information in this way, the Air Force also redefined how the 
systems and networks upon which its information resides and travels are viewed.  It has 
fostered the view that information is valuable to warfghter and to the enemies of 
warfighters.  It also designated information as another way that battles can be fought and 
decide the outcome of a war. 
 In 1987, an astronomer named Cliff Stoll was assigned to the computer 
department at the University of California at Berkeley.  His first assignment was to track 
down the cause of a 75 cent accounting error on the university’s mainframe.  Each minute 
of computer use was tracked and charged to an account, so the 75 cent discrepancy was 
out of place.  What followed was one of the first documented cases where a criminal was 
hacking into government systems to steal information (espionage) (Stoll: 1989).  At the 
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time, law enforcement and investigative agencies were not able to provide much support 
since their purview was either strictly military systems or required a crime involving 
$1,000,000 or more.  Clifford Stoll’s first well-documented attack in 1987 was only the 
first of many. The Air Force has continued to see attacks to its networks.  The number of 
documented attacks on Air Force networks has climbed, sometimes causing extensive 
damage resulting in lost time and money.  From 1992 to 1996, the number of intrusions 
into Air Force information systems rose from about 300 incidents to over 1400 
(Department of Defense, 1996: 12). As of 2003, the number of incidents had risen to 
5350 in Air Combat Command alone.   
Figure 1 (https://www.my.af.mil/gcss-af/USAF/cms/AFMC/files/269,14,Slide: 2004) 
The numbers, shown in Figure 1, represent a significant increase in a seven year period, 
but do not truly reflect the type and number of incidents the Air Force dealt with.  For 
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example, there are likely to have been many incidents have gone undetected, as a large 
number appear to be something other than an attack, so they are not accounted for in the 
numbers shown (Conry-Murray, 2004). 
 As the data in Figure 1 shows, the number of suspicious events being reported is 
significant.  In part, this is due to hackers and cyber-terrorists becoming more adept at 
wreaking havoc on systems, costing not only time and money, but possibly lives of 
personnel who rely on Air Force networks for accurate and timely data.  Research into 
areas such as computer forensics, network vulnerability, and other fringe technology 
areas may help us to identify and eliminate these threats and keep Air Force information 
and people safer.  It may also give AF investigators and prosecutors valuable tools in 
prosecuting perpetrators of these crimes while providing valuable information on the 
actual damage caused by incidents that can be used in building better networks.  The data 
acquired can also be used to determine future budget needs in terms of acquiring new 
technology, provide an idea of the true worth of the information that resides on AF 
networks, and give a detailed assessment of damage caused by incidents in a time of war.  
Additionally, Air Force research must begin to delve into area of damage assessment on 
its networks. 
Research Question  
 What is the AF currently using as a damage assessment method or model to assess 
damage (tangible and/or intangible) to its networks? 
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Investigative Questions  
1.)  Is the AF currently assessing damage to its networks caused by 
incidents?  
2.)  What method or model is the AF using to assess network damage or 
incidents?   
3.)  How does this method or model work?   
Proposed Methodology   
 Due to the qualitative nature of this research, an interview approach will be used. 
Managers from Air Force MAJCOM Network Operations Support Centers (NOSC) and 
AFCERTwho are in charge of handling network or computer incidents will be 
interviewed to answer the research and investigative questions.   
Scope and Limitations  
 This research delves into a relatively uninvestigated area; gaps in the knowledge 
as well as a lack of operational information or perspective are thus expected.  Since this 
research is Air Force specific, it may have limited applicability to outside organizations.  
Another limitation to this research is the amount of time available to do a comprehensive 
look at the subject matter.  In addition, researcher and interviewee bias is an issue since 
the research is subjective and hard to define.  There are a limited number of participants 
which also presents itself as a limiting factor to the overall research.  
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II. Literature Review 
Introduction 
Exhaustive searches of the existing literature have shown that the focus of current 
research on network damage assessment is on tools to protect against network attacks or methods 
for handling evidence once an incident is identified.  However, there is very little literature that 
looks at the true damage associated with computer network incidents.  The most intense AF-
related study on the subject matter was completed by Horony (1999).  This is also a topic of 
interest in some commercial sectors, as found in the article by Conry-Murray (2002), but it is very 
limited and still a relatively new undertaking.    In addition to the limited amount of existing 
literature concerning network damage assessment, there is also a problem with the term network 
damage assessment itself.  Historically the term “damage assessment” has been used for 
assessing damage after a physical attack, such a dropping a bomb on a target, and not in reference 
to networks or computer systems, though, as shown by CISCO Systems definition this is 
changing. 
Background and History on AF Networks 
 This section will describe the background and history leading up to the present 
day view of networks and their defense.  It will review recent cybercrime statistics from 
the Department of Justice, the use of information warfare, and a case study from one of 
the first documented cases of computer espionage. 
 Cybercrime is the term used by the Department of Justice to address incidents that 
occur on computers and computer networks which it deals with.  Cybercrime and the 
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attempts to prosecute it are in their infancy as shown by the Department of Justice 
statistics sections below: 
Data was collected for 2002 from 2,355 State court prosecutors who 
handle felony cases in State courts of general jurisdiction. During this time 
period, computer-related crimes (felony or misdemeanor) were prosecuted 
by 97% of full-time large offices, 73% of full-time medium offices, 44% 
of full-time small offices, and 17% of part-time offices. 
Three in ten offices nationwide reported prosecuting computer related 
crimes dealing with the transmittal of child pornography. A quarter 
of all offices prosecuted credit card fraud (27%) and bank card fraud 
(22%). Computer sabotage was prosecuted by 5% of the offices and 
theft of intellectual property by 3% (DOJ: 2003). 
 
This commentary is a reflection of the current state of cybercrime convictions and focus 
of investigations handled by the Department of Justice.  Cybercrime is the commercial 
terminology used in conjunction with computer or network related incidents.  The AF 
discusses information warfare as well as cybercrime in its literature.  Information warfare 
is seen as an entirely new form of warfare (Alberts, Gartska, Stein, 58: 2003). The 
military sees acts that the public sector calls cybercrimes as information warfare tactics 
that could be used to damage AF capabilities.  Increasingly, there is concern about 
information warfare being used not only against military targets, such as AF networks, 
but commercial targets that provide essential infrastructure support such as electricity or 
commercial satellites used to transfer military information.  These systems are considered 
to be more vulnerable than military targets due to the lack of security measures imposed 
on them, both internally and by governmental authorities (Berkowitz: 2000).  Not only 
are these infrastructure assets more open and susceptible to viruses and indirect attacks, 
they are also playing key support roles to military networks by providing data storage, 
power, conduits for information, and other necessary functions (Berkowitz: 2000).  
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Foreign opponents will find these commercial targets more viable and easier to hit than 
purely military targets, and some of these efforts will come from countries who have 
long-term investments in time, money, and people to make these attacks successful 
(Berkowitz: 2000).  Without network damage assessment, there is no method or model 
that will help the AF to understand how badly it has been impacted by an incident that 
has occurred, either directly or indirectly. 
 The technology now in place has changed drastically from the time of Clifford 
Stoll’s The Cuckoo’s Egg when system administrators had to be able to show a loss of 
$1,000,000 before the FBI would begin investigations (Stoll: 1989).  There is a need, 
though, to look at Stoll’s experiences as a case study for historical purposes and to gain 
knowledge from the past events that might have ramifications for current practices (Lee, 
58: 1996).  Historical information about computer incidents perpetrated over networks 
can hold the key to current problems as well as possibilities for understanding those 
problems (Lee, 59: 1996).  History also provides valuable case studies that highlight 
vulnerabilities in networks and computer systems, which can be used as teaching tools as 
well as lessons for those who will follow (Lee, 61: 1996). 
 More recent events, such as the February 2000 distributed denial of service 
attacks that were launched against major U.S. corporations, are also important in teaching 
researchers and practitioners that new ways for network attacks to be launched are 
happening now.  Evaluation of the network attacks might offer insight into predicting 
future attacks (Yurcik, Loomis, and Korcyk, 2: 2000).  However, current methods used 
by system administrators to monitor and assess network health only address prediction of 
attacks, not how to assess the damage done by those attacks. 
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Network-Centric Warfare 
 With the rapid movement of the AF into the Information Age, network-centric 
warfare becomes more important and will require the use of network damage  
assessment methods to support it.  Network-centric warfare is defined as: 
The conduct of military operations using networked information systems 
to generate a flexible and agile military force that acts under a common 
commanders intent, independent of the geographic or organizational 
disposition of the individual elements, and in which the focus of the 
warfighter is broadened away from individual, unit, or platform concerns 
to give primacy to the mission and responsibilities of the team, task group 
or coalition (Fewell and Hazen: 2003).   
 
This new concept of how the Department of Defense uses its information technology will 
also require a more accurate way to estimate the damage done to its computer network 
assets.  Since all elements of the force will be networked together, the vulnerability to 
network attacks increases (Fewell and Hazen, 2: 2003).  A key element of the definition 
of network-centric warfare is the focus on network-centric thinking and effectively 
networking the “warfighting enterprise” (Alberts, Gartska, Stein, 86: 2003).  This concept 
means that communications over networked platforms will be crucial to securing the 
battlefield and providing battlespace awareness of geographically separated entities to the 
warfighter (Alberts, Gartska, Stein, 86: 2003).  Historically, geographically separated 
forces were weak and vulnerable (Alberts, Garstka, Stein, 90: 2003), but with the use of 
network-centric principles this has changed.   Now information can be relayed almost 
simultaneously via networks as events occur to a variety of sources, such as ground units, 
naval warships, coalition allies, and AF planes in the air. Unfortunately, the changes also 
bring new dangers from data loss or theft, alteration of data that is intercepted by enemy 
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forces, and communication failure due to networks that are not functioning.  These 
dangers must be acknowledged and addressed. 
Why Damage Assessment Is So Important 
This section will explain the background for using damage assessment on AF 
networks.  Several AF documents were reviewed to find pertinent and timely data on the 
AF perspective of network damage assessment.         
 AF Policy Directive 33-2, Communications and Information: Information 
Protection (1996), lays the groundwork explaining who is responsible for different 
actions associated with the AF Network.  It also provides a glossary of key terms used by 
the AF when discussing its networks; however, it overlooks assessing damage to AF 
networks, but focuses instead on network security and setup.  Though this policy 
directive is dated 1996, many things have happened to change the face of networks and 
how they are secured and handled.  AF Policy Directive 31-4, Information Security 
(1998), deals with Information Security.  Again, this directive is outdated, but it is the 
most current version being used.  It deals primarily with securing classified information, 
but it does not address the issue of how to assess the amount of damage that occurs to Air 
Force networks when information is compromised. 
  Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5, Information Operations (2003), discusses 
information operations (IO) and how they are “integral to all AF operations.”  This 
document focuses on IO and its employment of the core capabilities of influence 
operations, electronic warfare operations, and network warfare operations (AFDD 2-5, 1, 
2003).  It highlights information superiority as a critical part of air and space superiority 
which give commanders freedom from attack (AFDD 2-5, 1: 2003).  However, it does 
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not mention how commanders are supposed to deal with network attacks should they 
occur.  In all of the AF instructions and documents reviewed, the topic of how to 
accurately assess network damage is not addressed.   
Current Research on Network Damage Assessment 
 In 1999, an AFIT student undertook the task of developing a model for damage 
assessment of computer security incidents.  He found that there was no previous research 
to build on (Horony, 6: 1999).  Despite this lack of foundation, he built the model shown 
(Figure 2), which is the only model of its kind that could be found. 
 
Figure 2 Damage Assessment Model (Horony: 1999) 
 
Horony used a qualitative method of gathering data related to computer incident damage 
assessment (which also included networks), by interviewing subject matter experts 
(Horony, 26: 1999).  This model provides a very top-level view of the areas that Horony 
found significant.  These areas should be looked at in a computer incident damage 
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assessment model, but it does not offer specific avenues to performing damage 
assessment.  This model provides a starting point for developing methods or models for 
network damage assessment, but it requires refinement to make it truly usable for 
executing specific actions.  
 The public sector looks at network damage assessment in terms of 
financial costs.  A recent article in Network Magazine (Conry-Murray: 2004) 
discusses the problems associated with “tallying the costs of security incidents.” 
This comment gives a good explanation of the need for damage assessment on 
networks of any kind.  It says: 
Estimating the costs of intrusions, defacements, virus infections, and so on 
helps shape annual security budgets.  Losses attributed to computer crime 
will affect revenue statements.   Companies that want to report the crime 
to law enforcement, or file a civil suit, must also determine an incident’s 
financial impact.  Judges will demand hard numbers to help determine 
sentencing and restitution, and any sums cited by plaintiffs are sure to be 
attacked by defense (Conry-Murray: 2004). 
 
Though there are other issues that are important to organizations in the public 
sector, such as reputation, ultimately, the financial costs are the driving force in 
attempts to use network damage assessment. 
Link Between Damage Assessment and Computer/Cyber Forensics 
 The field of cyber forensics is relatively new though there are many white papers 
available from private companies who offer evidence gathering services for a fee.  Cyber 
forensics has very close ties to the concept of network damage assessment since the work 
done using cyber forensics can provide valuable information that can be used in making 
network damage assessments. 
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 Computers and networks have become the targets of modern cat burglars.  They 
contain a vast amount of wealth in terms of information and data that is extremely 
sensitive and can cause empires to crumble if lost.  In the last 15 to 20 years, computer 
forensics have become a valuable tool in protecting information wealth, or at least finding 
the perpetrator of the “crime”.   
Since computer forensics is still a new and developing science, the procedures 
being used to gather electronic evidence have come under intense scrutiny.  Due to the 
seemingly endless uses that are being found for computers, computer forensics is rapidly 
expanding so that “electronic evidence” can be handled in a manner that allows 
organizations make decisions based on evidence rather than suspicion or circumstantial 
evidence. 
 Computer forensics has become increasingly important to organizations, both 
government and private.  The increase in unauthorized computer users, internal 
espionage, cyber terrorism, and cyber crime all make the use of computer forensics vital 
to organizations by providing a much needed way to gather data after a computer or 
network incident and by providing the data necessary to conduct network damage 
assessment.  In 2002, a survey completed by Computer Forensics Inc., a consulting firm 
that specializes in computer forensics, showed the seriousness of computer intrusions: 
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 90% of respondents detected computer security breaches 
 80% acknowledged financial losses 
 
 44% of respondents reported losses of less than $500M 
 
 40% detected penetration from outside the network 
 
 40% detected penetration from inside the network  
 (Juhnke, 2002: 1-2) 
 
Considering the amount of information that is kept on computer systems and how much 
that information is relied upon, the numbers above are important.  People with malicious 
intentions have only to gain access to the target system to cause massive damage.  They 
could even bring a halt to essential information-based infrastructures such as electrical 
grids, hospitals, or air traffic control systems as can be seen by Figures 3 and 4 there have 
been many attacks on AF systems.  At the time of the attacks, 1993, the terminology used 
by the AF was different.  Uncontrolled incidents were ones that were not caught until 
damage had already been inflicted on the systems.  Malicious logic is the term used for 
worms, virus, and trap doors that cause damage to information systems. 
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Figure 3 AF Information Systems Intrusions, 1993  (AFMAN 33-270: 1993) 
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Figure 4 AF Malicious Logic Incidents, 1993 (AFMAN 33-270: 1993) 
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 One of the keys to good forensic science of any kind is, “Do No Harm” (Juhnke, 
2002: 4).  First and foremost, this means that the investigator does not contaminate data 
important to the investigation, either inadvertently or purposefully.  This becomes vitally 
important in computer forensics.  Due to the volatility of the medium and the ease with 
which the “evidence” can be tainted, it is essential that computer evidence be treated in a 
systematic manner.  However, there is no discussion found in the literature that addresses 
a systematic process for assessing the damage done by cyber criminals. 
 In a case where the criminal has used a specific computer as a portal onto a 
system, sometimes the computer has to remain untouched.  It cannot even be removed 
from the network lest key evidence be lost.  A computer forensics expert can safely 
gather information and ensure a secure chain of custody that will be useful in future 
litigation (Juhnke 2002: 4).   Unfortunately, if the computer cannot be removed from the 
network, it (the computer) will still be vulnerable to the criminal who is using it.  The 
first reaction of any system administrator is to secure the network, so educating the 
system administrators and users on what is required of them in case a network incident 
occurs is necessary for computer forensics to work.   
 Forensics experts find their evidence in one of three places generally.  Evidence 
can be found on the perpetrator’s computer, on the “victim” computer, and on the 
network devices that have been affected (Desmond, 2000: 1).   All of these items are 
easily tampered with, so a computer forensics specialist must be sure to maintain the 
integrity of the electronic evidence contained on a system. 
 The processes involved in conducting computer forensics are currently being 
standardized internationally through the use of the International Standards Organization 
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(ISO).  This will help make computer forensics more reliable when used in network 
damage assessment.  Specifically, ISO 17799 is “a comprehensive set of controls 
comprising best practices in information security” or, in other terms, a generic 
information security standard that can be universally applied which will give people 
working in computer forensics a common set of tools and practices to draw from 
(http://www.iso-17799.com: 2005). ISO 17799 was designed to “promote good practice 
for information security management” (Janes, 2002: 2).  ISO 17799 addresses incident 
handling and the required skills to perform computer forensic investigations.  ISO 17799 
focuses on three major areas:  protection of assets, vulnerabilities of assets, and human 
threats (Janes, 2002: 3-4).  All of these areas are important and need to be addressed 
when assessing damage on AF networks because damage to one or all of these areas 
could lead to a loss of mission capability by AF warfighters. 
 Despite the relatively recent beginnings of computer forensics, it is rapidly 
becoming a part of organizations’ information technology strategy and can provide a 
foundation for network damage assessment practices, methods or models.  There are 
many people using a variety of techniques to gain access to data, bring down networks, 
steal trade secrets, corrupt or ruin information, or cause irreparable or catastrophic 
physical or logical damage to networks in whatever way they can.  Computer forensics 
personnel are developing means to combat these threats through policy, software and 
hardware.  Computer forensics is a growing science that will become increasingly 
important as society continues to automate and depend on technology and as 
organizations try to find ways to do network damage assessment.  The key point of 
computer forensic science is to preserve the evidence (Takahashi, 2004: 74).  When 
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assessing the damage to AF networks, the evidence is critical to finding holes and 
vulnerabilities that must be fixed.  Electronic evidence also provides the background 
necessary for tracking the criminal (Takahashi, 2004: 76).  Computer forensics will 
provide the groundwork for gathering the pertinent information when in-depth network 
damage assessments are required. 
Summary 
 Network technology and network damage assessment is an area that the AF has 
taken an interest in.  AF personnel have written several policy and guidance documents to 
ensure that AF networks run well and securely.  However, there is no evidence in the 
existing AF instructions to show that the AF has looked beyond securing the network and 
closing any vulnerabilities that may occur.  The field of computer forensics offers ways 
to gather evidence of the damage done by criminals who attack networks, but it currently 
does not address the problem of providing an accurate estimate of the damage caused.   
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III. Methodology  
 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the methodology used to collect data and procedures for 
analyzing data used to answer the research questions.  The research being done is 
qualitative research. An interview-based methodology was utilized to gain the maximum 
amount of information. 
Methodology 
 Qualitative research is used to “. . . answer questions about the complex nature of 
phenomena, often with the purpose of describing and understanding the phenomena from 
the participants’ point of view” (Leedy and Ormrod, 1985:101).  This definition provides 
background that explains the reason a qualitative approach was utilized in this research.  
Qualitative researchers, unlike quantitative researchers, have generic questions with no 
clear variables, and collect large amounts of data from a small pool of subjects (Leedy 
and Ormrod, 1985: 101).  The data collected is then organized and a verbal description is 
used to portray the situation that has been studied” (Leedy and Ormrod, 1985:101).  For 
purposes of this study, a qualitative approach was chosen to provide a description of the 
phenomena of damage assessment on networks and an interpretation of the data obtained 
through subject interviews (Leedy and Ormrod, 1985: 148).   
 The specific qualitative approach chosen was an interview with target subjects.  
Based on the extensive number of uses for interviews, the following description will be 
used in this research to define the use of the interview technique. 
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Interviews provide in-depth information about a particular research issue 
or question. Because the information is not quantifiable (i.e., not amenable 
to statistical analysis), the interview often is described as a qualitative 
research method. Whereas quantitative research methods (e.g., the 
experiment) gather a small amount of information from many subjects, 
interviews gather a broad range of information from a few subjects. 
(http://www.rider.edu/~suler/interviews.html#whatis: 2004). 
 
 The current research being undertaken presents multiple challenges which lends 
itself to the interview technique.  The subjects were anonymous; however, the interviews 
were carried out via telephone interviews and through e-mail.  The subjects were subject 
matter experts in the area of computer incident response from Network Operations and 
Security Centers (NOSCs) that reside at the Major Command level and the Air Force 
Computer Emergency Response Team (AFCERT).  Feedback was requested from the 
research subjects to ensure that information provided by the subjects was used 
appropriately by the researcher. 
 The interview questions focused on ascertaining if subjects use a damage 
assessment method or model to assess the level of damage that has been inflicted after a 
network incident and the training required to use the method or model.  There were six 
interview questions (Appendix A) asked of each subject.  These questions are aligned to 
the three investigative questions posed in Chapter I.    All questions were open-ended in 
an attempt to gather as much information as possible without introducing interviewer 
bias.   
 Investigative question one was addressed by the first interview question: “Is the 
AF currently assessing damage to its networks caused by incidents?” The subjects were 
asked is your organization using some form of damage assessment.  If they answered 
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“Yes”, the subject then continued to the next question.  If they answered “No,” they were 
directed to a new question.  
 For the second investigative question, “What method or model is the AF using to 
assess network damage or incidents?”  there were two interview questions asked. They 
were:  “How did your organization decide on the damage assessment procedures/model 
being used?”, and “How does this method or model work?”  These questions attempted to 
gather as much data about how the damage assessment was being accomplished in an 
organization. 
 Finally, investigative question number three asked:  “How does this method or 
model work?”  There was one interview question which applied to this investigative 
question.  The interview question asked:  “Please describe the procedures you use in 
assessing damage (step-by-step).”  The question was designed to gather detailed data 
about the procedures that made up the method or model being used by the subjects’ 
organizations.   
 There were three additional questions that did not directly relate to one of the 
three investigative questions, but provided useful data to explain why a subjects’ 
organization did not have a process or method to perform damage assessment or at what 
level of the Air Force subjects believed damage assessment should be performed.   
Subjects 
The subjects being interviewed came from MAJCOM NOSCs and AFCERT 
incident response or security branches.  They were mid-level managers in charge of 
offices that handle computer security incidents.  A total of 14 subjects were solicited 
from the six Major Command NOSCs (including the Air Force Reserve Center NOSC) as 
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well as individuals from the AF Cert (organization responsible for overall AF network 
security and health) to provide data for the research.   
Procedures for Analyzing Data 
 The interview data was broken up by each research question.  A table was created 
in which all of the questions were used as the headings with the subsequent subject 
answers placed in the appropriate box.  This allowed the researcher to easily manipulate 
the interview data and take each question by itself for review.  The interviewer’s 
conclusions were put into paragraph format using the subjects’ responses to the interview 
questions.   
 The hermeneutic method is an interpretive research method that attempts to 
understand phenomena through the meanings that people assign to them (Myers, 4: 
1997).  Basically, this method looks at the similarities and differences amongst the 
respondents’ answers in an attempt to build an overall picture.  The hermeneutic method 
is highly qualitative and leaves the researcher open to personal and subject bias plus the 
research lacks reproducibility.  However, this method can be very useful when the data is 
limited and the research is new by allowing for a holistic view of issues 
(http://redesignresearch.com/pde-3.htm, 2005).  The researcher chose the hermeneutic 
method because there was a limited pool of data available from the MAJCOM NOSCs 
and AFCERT due to the small number of personnel performing network damage 
assessment.  Additionally, there was very little previous research into the area of network 
damage assessment and the hermeneutic method is appropriate when research is dealing 
with new phenomena.     
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   In researching network damage assessment, the hermeneutic method can be used 
to understand network damage assessment by assessing the meaning assigned to it by 
people at AF MAJCOM NOSCs and AFCERT.  The hermeneutic method is also useful 
as a method of interpretation of “non-structured” and “non formal” approaches for 
understanding and decision-making (Bannister, 5: 2004).  Because the hermeneutic 
method is useful in interpreting non-structured data such as the responses given in the 
interview questions, it was chosen to allow the researcher flexibility in interpreting and 
deciding how to utilize the data provided by the subjects.  Ultimately, hermeneutics is 
called the art or science of interpretation which is what the researcher has done with the 
data obtained from the interviews with the seven subjects (Carlisle and Olson, 1: 2005). 
Carlisle and Olson go on to say that the hermeneutic method “begins with clustering 
observations into groups, seeking cohesive, thematic unity among clusters” (5: 2005).  
The researcher does this by creating a table with all of the data then analyzing the data 
based on the similarities and dissimilarities contained within the subjects’ answers. 
Limitations 
 The research had several limitations.  One concern was finding an adequate pool 
of subject matter experts in network damage assessment to provide enough information.  
The short span of time allowed for producing this research created an additional 
limitation. One final limitation was the hermeneutic method.  Though it has gained 
popularity as a research method in information systems and associated research, it was 
still subjective in that it provided ample opportunity for researcher bias in the data 
analysis process. 
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Summary 
The methodology to be used is interview based and has several limitations.  The 
subject pool is small and they are being interviewed using open-ended questions to 
extract the maximum amount of information possible.  The subjects are being pulled from 
a highly specialized group of Air Force professionals, to include civilians and contractors 
to obtain the pertinent information.  The data will be laid out in a table in order to analyze 
it and attempt to build a picture using the hermeneutic method of where the Air Force 
currently is in the use of damage assessment or damage assessment models on networks.  
The hermeneutic method allows the researcher to analyze similarities and dissimilarities 
found in the data.   
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IV. Results and Analysis 
 
Sample Demographics 
 There were seven subjects interviewed from four MAJCOM NOSCs and 
AFCERT.  The breakout according to AF rank was:  two enlisted (Staff Sergeant and 
Master Sergeant) from Air Materiel Command (AMC), one government contractor 
(United States Air Force in Europe), and four company grade officers (one from Air 
Force Materiel Command, two from AFCERT, and one from AMC).  The average 
number of years of experience in network security or support per subject was 2.3 years 
with the range being 6 months to 8 years 2 months.  All positions held were in MAJCOM 
NOSCs or AFCERT.  Two of the seven positions were NOSC crew commanders, two 
were network technicians, one was an officer in charge Incident Response, one was a 
flight commander, and one was a senior network security analyst.  Several MAJCOM 
NOSCs did not respond for unknown reasons.  This lack of response is considered 
normal by Leedy and Ormrod (Leedy and Ormrod, 1985, 223).  They attribute it to 
response bias which can be caused by a variety of factors including:  subject’s education 
level, interest in the topic, or other factors (Leedy and Ormrod, 1985, 223).   
Assessment by research question 
1.)  Is your organization using some form of network damage assessment? 
 The data obtained from this question was yes or no answers.  All respondents 
answered this question.  Five of the seven answered yes, their organization was using 
some form of network damage assessment based on the definition given previously.  
Using the hermeneutic method to evaluate the answers from the five respondents, there 
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were several similarities, as well as several differences in the subject’s assessment of 
whether their organization was using some form of network damage.  Two respondent’s 
answers differed in that they did not feel that their organization was using network 
damage assessment.  
1.a)  Please describe the procedures you use in assessing damage (step-by-step). 
Similarities in damage assessment methods 
 The use of in-house checklists was noted in two of the five respondent’s answers.  
Additionally, information gathering,  such as garnering all of the details of an incident 
from the personnel involved and recording it form of reports  that are used to make an 
evaluation was noted by two subjects.  The information gathering was mentioned in one 
form or another in all five subjects answers.  Completing a checklist was considered a 
form of information gathering by one subject, however, other subjects to not state that 
they use checklists for information gathering but rather as a part of the procedure, or 
information gathering is separate from filling out a checklist associated with network 
damage assessment. 
 Multiple software packages were also mentioned as tools that were used in 
damage assessment. These included Remedy, ASIM (Automated Security Incident 
Measurement), and IDS (Intrusion Detection System).  All of the software tools were 
parts of a larger process incorporated into the damage assessment methods of the specific 
organizations.  These tools were used to monitor the network for intrusions and alert the 
appropriate authority or to incidents reported from other organizations. 
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Differences in damage assessment methods 
 Only one of the five respondents mentioned using an AF instruction (AFI 10-206, 
Operational Reporting: 2004) as a basis for their damage assessment method.  The AF 
instruction was used to define reporting procedures, such as damage assessment, to a 
higher authority which was not mentioned by name.  All other procedures were generated 
in-house with no acknowledged guidance from AF, Department of Defense (DoD), or 
commercial sources. Part of the process of network damage assessment was the creation 
of After Action Reports which was used to annotate the information acquired from the 
incident.  
Overall assessment of question 1.a 
 Though there appears to be several areas where the damage assessment methods 
overlap, there are also several key points that differ dramatically.   Checklists and 
standard reporting or incident response procedures for assessing damage after an incident 
have occurred is one area where there were similarities noted by the researcher.  
Checklists and procedures that guide personnel step-by-step through a pre-determined 
process seem to be the method of preference of most of the organizations to complete 
their version of damage assessment. These checklists and procedures were developed in-
house according the information provided by the subjects.   A reliance on software as a 
tool to aid in damage assessment was noted among several of the five subjects.   
 However, only one organization appears to have based any part of their damage 
assessment method on existing AF or DoD instructions. Because of this lack of AF 
guidance, it is difficult to ascertain what other official guidance was being used to 
develop a damage assessment method at the other organizations.   
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 Additionally, the two subjects who answered no to this question (Is your 
organization using some form of network damage assessment?) were also significant 
because they were from the same NOSC that had a yes answer.  This could be because of 
a validity issue with the question or a situation internal to the organization such as the 
subject’s who responded no were not a part of the network damage assessment process 
and so did not know it existed.  Reporting to higher level authorities such as commanders 
or the AFCERT (by NOSCs) was also cited in several subjects’ comments.  Reporting 
was either to leadership or higher level authorities and was not part if all of the subjects 
responses. 
1.b)  How did your organization decide on the damage assessment procedures/model 
being used? 
 Five of the seven subjects responded to this question.  Following the 
hermeneutic method, subject’s answers were compared and contrasted to build a 
picture that explained how that subject’s organization developed their existing 
network damage assessment model or method.  One of the five subjects was unable 
to offer data that could be used based on his lack of knowledge in this area, therefore 
only four subjects’ data was evaluated. 
Similarities in damage assessment model selection 
 Three of the four respondents said they utilized outside agencies help in 
creating their procedures for damage assessment.    These outside agencies included, 
but were not limited to:  Air Force Communication Agency, AF NOSC, other 
MAJCOM NOSCs, AFCERT, and Regional Computer Emergency Response Teams. 
They did this by informally contacting other agencies to ask what procedures were 
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being used there.  Two of the four respondents commented that guidance came from 
“higher authorities”. 
Dissimilarities in damage assessment model selection 
 One of the respondents noted that lessons learned and network exercises were 
valuable in developing their “procedures” for damage assessment.   The exercises 
provided experience about how network attacks occurred and the kind of electronic 
evidence to look for when assessing the damage caused by an incident.   However, 
the other three respondents did not mention this at all. 
 One respondent stated that he relied heavily on existing software (IDS) logs 
to assess the amount of damage; however, the subject also noted that this method 
was not foolproof since it only caught known suspicious activity. 
 Only one respondent said that their damage assessment method was 
developed from AF and DoD guidance.  This differs from the other subjects’ 
responses in the way it was developed by supporting existing procedures through AF 
guidance while the other subjects focused on developing in-house procedures based 
on information they acquired from outside agencies.  This response stands out since 
the subject’s organization did not rely on informal communication or guidance from 
“higher authority” to develop a procedure for network damage assessment. 
Overall assessment of question 1.b 
 Overall, the decision making processes for developing network damage 
assessment procedures utilized by the four different individuals’ organizations was 
drastically different, though there was some overlap.  Many of the subjects’ stated 
that they contacted other NOSCs or agencies responsible for network security; 
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however, there was no formal process for developing damage assessment 
procedures.  Each subject’s organization developed internal stand-alone procedures 
that were specific to their needs. 
1.c)  Does the damage assessment method your organization uses require special 
training?  If so, what is it? 
 Of the seven subjects who responded, five answered this question.  Using the 
hermeneutic method to look at the similarities and differences in responses led to a 
conclusion as to whether special training was required to perform damage 
assessment in the respondents’ organizations. 
Similarities in damage assessment training requirements 
 On the job training (OJT) for network damage assessment processes was 
mentioned in three of the five subjects comments.  OJT was particularly important 
where specialized checklists or procedures were performed when an incident 
occurred.  
 Two subjects referenced additional specialized training that was required for 
anyone who would be performing damage assessment.  This training included tips-n-
tricks, as well as training on the OSI model, Linux, Unix, and other unique software 
or systems used in the organization.  The subjects felt this training was important in 
executing their damage assessment processes because it gave them in-depth system 
knowledge that could assist them in the event an incident occurred. 
 Two of the subjects also mentioned an in-house certification process, either 
specific to network damage assessment or generic to the crew commander position, 
with training in network damage assessment as a subset or secondary portion of the 
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overall certification process.  This certification was required before damage 
assessment could be performed.   
Differences in damage assessment training requirements 
 There was no single form of training that all five subjects mentioned when 
discussing network damage assessment.  Each organization had a unique training 
plan that identified areas that were required before an individual was allowed to 
work on the network.  These training plans included learning specific operating 
systems and software programs.  Specific forms of training on network damage 
assessment were not addressed by the subjects’. One of the respondent’s training 
consisted primarily of learning how to handle a specific software program, ASIM, 
which is used to measure security incidents.  Only one of the respondents mentioned 
a standardized program of training for all personnel who will be performing damage 
assessment.  Another subject mentioned that a standardized training plan was being 
developed for network damage assessment. 
Overall assessment of question 1.c 
 Network damage assessment training is significant to all five respondent’s 
organizations; however, the training is drastically different in each one.  The focus of 
network damage assessment training is formal in some and informal (OJT) in others.  
As seen in the previous question, all five organizations had a different training 
program for network damage assessment.  OJT was the most common method used 
according to the responses given, but formal training was also mentioned in two of 
the responses.  Certification on network damage assessment or on the crew 
commander position was also mentioned by several subjects; however, this 
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certification was based on criteria that only applied to their organization.  It was also 
noted that there was a requirement in most of the organizations for specialized 
training, generally in operating systems or software, based on specific systems being 
used for network monitoring or network performance.  Overall, there were several 
indications that specialized training was required for network damage assessment. 
1.d)  Have you found other damage assessment models or methods that are not currently 
being used by your organization?    What are they? 
Overall assessment of question 1.d 
Only one of the five subjects who responded to this question said they had 
found other network damage assessment methods or models; however, he called 
them “new application programs” that were used by system administrators to 
“monitor system status”.  All other subjects responded “no” with no additional 
comments.   
1.e and 2.a)  At what level do you believe that network damage assessment can/should be 
performed:  Base, MAJCOM, Service, and DoD?  Explain. 
 All seven subjects answered this question.  There were many similarities and 
differences found amongst the seven subject’s answers. 
Similarities in damage assessment performance level 
 Four of the seven respondents agreed that network damage assessment 
needed to encompass all levels of the computer network hierarchy from base level up 
to DoD.  Two subjects believed that the responsibility for performing network 
damage assessment should be accomplished by system owners at each level.  Two 
subjects commented that damage assessment was dependent on the type of attack, 
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but felt that the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) should be the one performing 
damage assessment at all levels. 
Differences in damage assessment performance level 
 One subject said that damage assessment was the responsibility first of the system 
owner but he felt all levels shared responsibility “equally”.  This subject was unique in 
his view that all organizational levels should be involved in network damage assessment. 
Overall assessment of question 1.e and 2.a 
 Overall, there seems to be consensus that each level (base, MAJCOM, AF, DoD) 
must perform damage assessment.  However, there were two subjects that believed that 
the system owner at each level should be performing damage assessment.  Comparatively 
speaking, it was clear that the majority of the respondents see a need for damage 
assessment to be done at all levels within the AF and up to DoD.  However, there is no 
clear answer to who they believe has the ultimate responsibility for performing it. 
2.)  Do you see a need for a damage assessment model in your organization?  Why? 
Overall assessment of question 2 
 Only two respondents answered this question, and they were in agreement 
upon their answer.  They saw no need for network damage assessment, and both felt 
that it would only create an additional workload for personnel responsible for 
maintaining network integrity. 
Summary 
 There was no clear network damage assessment model used across the four 
NOSCs and AFCERT; methods or models used by each organization were developed in-
house.  Additionally, training was mostly developed in-house and differed greatly from 
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one organization to the next.  There was some agreement (four of seven) among 
respondents about who should be performing network damage assessment, but it was not 
unanimous. 
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V.  Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Findings 
 The researcher asked the following research questions in Chapter I. 
1.)  Is the AF currently assessing damage to its networks caused by 
incidents?  
2.)  What method or model is the AF using to assess network damage or 
incidents?   
3.)  How does this method or model work?   
The research undertaken attempted to answer each of these questions.  Question one 
found that there was not an AF-level program for network damage assessment, but 
individual programs created by each NOSC. Each NOSC had developed a network 
damage assessment method or model that was unique to their location.  There was some 
indication that AF has provided guidance for some locations.  Overall, each organization 
did say they were doing network damage assessment when incidents occurred on their 
networks. 
 For question number two there was evidence that network damage assessment 
methods or models were being used when an incident occurred, but they were not all the 
same across all organizations.  Additionally, the damage assessment methods or models 
being used were developed internally by each organization, so there was no standard 
method or model for damage assessment across the organizations studied.  Also of note, 
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was that there are possibly different methods used to assess network damage within 
specific organizations based on the specific type of incident that occurs. 
 Finally, the answer to question number three depended on the organization. Each 
organization has developed a site-specific method or model to address damage 
assessment.  Each method worked differently from the other organizations’.  There was 
some evidence that similarities exist amongst the methods or models used by the 
organizations; however, this was not due to agreement among the NOSCs or AFCERT 
about one specific method or model. Given the fact that the organizations did not use the 
same guidance and were working in different organizations it was important that they 
developed similar, generic procedures to handle network incidents 
 Another finding that the researcher found to be significant was the reliance on 
software to do network damage assessment.  This could pose a concern about the validity 
and reliability of the assessment being done for several reasons.  Software is a valuable 
tool that can augment a damage assessment method or model as a decision support tool, 
but it should not be the focus of the solution.  Software can be tampered with and often 
has bugs that do not show up until after the software is in use.  Additionally, hackers are 
constantly working out new ways to get around software, either through existing 
vulnerabilities or new vulnerabilities introduced with patches or upgrades.  Software can 
also introduce unnecessary complexity by adding another step into an existing procedure, 
or requiring in-depth training.  Software can also add additional work requirements that 
are not needed in completing network damage assessment such as requiring constant 
monitoring or maintenance so that the software works correctly.  One last concern with 
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relying too heavily on software is that the data it contains is only as good as the personnel 
who have access to it.  This means that someone who is incompetent or who has 
dishonest motives can wreak havoc by changing or destroying data that an organization 
depends on to do network damage assessment.  Once the data has been changed, the 
output used by the network personnel becomes unreliable and can cause misdirection of 
work efforts, a false sense of security, or a complete network breakdown. 
 An additional finding that should be noted is the lack of clarity regarding the 
responsibilities of specific organizations in doing network damage assessment.  There is 
no agency or organization specifically responsible for doing damage assessment on AF 
networks.  There is also no agreement at what level of the AF or DoD the performance of 
network damage assessment should take place.  
 Finally, a few additional factors were highlighted.  One factor of note was the 
reliance on checklists to perform network damage assessment and “information gathering 
processes” such as reports created when an incident occurred.  These reports were 
generated and used by the individual NOSCs or AFCERT to brief higher authorities such 
as commanders and other leaders.   Multiple respondents noted checklists in their 
interviews, though each checklist was developed in-house.  Finally, training on network 
damage assessment was noted as an area of importance.  OJT was key in several 
organizations along with some form of certification on the crew commander position or 
network damage assessment.  Again, training on damage assessment procedures was 
different from organization to organization. 
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Limitations 
 There were multiple limitations encountered during this research.  The first is 
investigator bias.  Another form of bias is response or non-response bias which happens 
when subjects choose not to answer a question or not to answer a question honestly 
(Leedy and Ormrod, 222: 1985).  The last form of bias that posed a limitation to this 
study is sampling bias.  The small subject pool added constraints to the amount of data 
available.  There were also limitations in the number of possible subjects, as well as the 
ability to communicate and contact the required subjects.  This led to sampling bias and 
has implications when generalizations are being made about the larger population.  It is 
possible that the data collected only applies in the organizations that responded, and 
therefore is of no use to the AF as a whole.  Also, there was a limited amount of time to 
complete the research which did not allow for as comprehensive a study as the subject 
requires.  This will be addressed in the Recommendation section as a suggestion for 
future research.  
 It is important to note that three of the seven subjects interviewed were from the 
same MAJCOM NOSC.  Also, there were five different job titles among the seven 
respondents. Both of these factors limit the overall validity of their answers. 
 The final limitation that is important to note in this research is that the interview 
questions used were not validated beforehand.  This limitation leads to validity questions 
for the overall research since the definitions or interview questions used were not proven 
to answer the investigative questions posed by the researcher. 
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Recommendations 
 A standardized definition of network damage assessment created by higher 
authority such as DoD or Headquarters AF would benefit the AF when discussing the 
needs and requirements for damage assessment on its networks. Based on the comments 
that came back on training programs, the researcher recommends that a standardized 
class should developed for Basic Communications Officer Training (BCOT) or Advanced 
Communications Officer Training (ACOT) that would teach basics of network damage 
assessment as defined by the AF.  Standardized instructions, policies, and procedures 
would also be valuable in defining the network damage assessment process and allow for 
consensus across all NOSCs and AFCERT. 
 Though in a general sense, there were a lot of similarities amongst the responses, 
there were also a lot of differences that led the researcher to the conclusion that the AF 
needs to look at standardizing network damage assessment processes and procedures into 
a common method or model.   Without a standardized method or model for damage 
assessment, there is no clear answer to questions about the amount of damage caused to 
AF networks by incidents.  
 The subjects interviewed appeared to force their responses to match the definition 
given for network damage assessment, though it is possible they were mistaking network 
damage assessment with their existing methods for incident response.  The researcher 
reached this conclusion by reviewing the checklists used by one of the NOSCs which 
were designed to deal with classified message incidents and computer incidents, not 
incidents occurring on the network.    This tendency to force their responses to match the 
given definition for network damage assessment could be because the definition was too 
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general, leaving the subjects open to interpret it too loosely or liberally.  Since there is not 
a current definition in use by the AF for network damage assessment, there is a lot of 
room for subjective interpretation. 
Future Research 
There are many areas associated with network damage assessment that deserve 
additional research.  One suggestion for a future research project would be to validate 
Horony’s model from Chapter II.  It is the only model of its kind that was found in the 
literature review, but it has not been researched beyond the initial findings.  Further 
validating the model by using it to evaluate case studies could advance the area of 
network damage assessment dramatically and offer a clear source for NOSCs and 
AFCERT to develop their damage assessment procedures and methods in the absence of 
clear guidance from DoD directives and AF instructions.  Horony’s model could easily be 
tested by taking existing cases of network incidents and attempting to use his model to 
assess the damage. 
Another possible project for future research would be to take an existing damage 
assessment model (possibly battle damage assessment) used by the AF Intelligence 
community and attempt to apply it to computer or network incidents.  It would give 
network damage assessment an operational flavor as well as provide a framework from 
which to begin assessing damage to networks.  It could also expand the perspectives of 
warfighters and leaders when confronted with network incidents by providing a clear 
assessment of the amount of damage done to a network by an attacker. 
One final suggestion for future research would be a longitudinal study over 
multiple years that look at AF NOSC’s and AFCERT’s network damage assessment 
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models and methods in an attempt to see how the processes evolve over time.  This 
would offer insight as to how network damage assessment models and methods used by 
the AF change over time.   
Summary 
There is a significant evidence to show that network damage assessment is being 
accomplished, though it is being accomplished based on individual organizations’ 
concepts of damage assessment, not on a standard model.  There is no evidence that the 
AF as an organization is using one specific damage assessment or model.  Rather, 
individual organizations within the AF are developing their own methods and models to 
perform network damage assessment. 
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Appendix A 
 
Interview Questionnaire 
 
All information is confidential and will only be used for this research.   
 
Below are the definitions for damage assessment and incidents.  
Damage assessment is defined in this study as a method or model that can provide 
accurate, re-producible information about the tangible and intangible effects of a 
network attack (virus, hacker, insider, natural disaster).  
 
An incident is any adverse event whereby some aspect of computer security could be 
threatened: loss of data confidentiality, disruption of data or system integrity, or 
disruption or denial of availability. 
 
Questions: 
General Information:   
Job Title_________________________________________________________ 
Time in Position___________________________________________________ 
 
Questions: 
1.)  Is your organization using some form of damage assessment?  
 YES (go to question 1.a)  NO (go to question 2) 
   1.a)  Please describe the procedures you use in assessing damage (step-by-step). 
______________________________________________________________________ 
   1.b)  How did your organization decide on the damage assessment procedures/model 
being used? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
   1.c)  Does the damage assessment method your organization uses require special 
education/training?   
 YES NO 
If so, what is it? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
   1.d)  Have you found other damage assessment measures that are not currently being 
used by your organization?      
 YES NO 
           What are they? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
   1.e)  At what level do you believe that damage assessment can/should be performed:  
Base, MAJCOM, Service, DoD?  
Explain.________________________________________________________________ 
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2.) Do you see a need for a damage assessment model in your organization?   
 YES NO 
Why? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
   2.a)  At what level do you believe that damage assessment can/should be performed:  
Base, MAJCOM, Service, DoD?  Explain. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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